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Introduction
The project reported here is a three country project,
Estonia, Finland and the UK. It is funded by the
European Commission AGIS Programme, The
Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security. It
investigates the issues of corruption by organised crime
in relation to border controls and immigration using as
a case study the Finnish - Russian and the Estonian -
Russian border, the methods of illegal facilitation of
people across borders, the role of crime groups and
networks as well as organised crime and the relationship
between illegal facilitation and exploitation in the labour
market.
A working hypothesis of the research is that the
EU border with Russia is ‘weak’ and vulnerable to
corruption at different levels: systemic, that  is
corruption is incorporated within the system of
immigration and border crossing, institutional where the
institution is tolerant of corrupt practice and individual
where the person is prepared to undertake illegal actions
because their employment provides them with an
opportunity to exploit their position for gain.  So,
corruption is used to maintain the flow of people across
the border illegitimately by utilising existing legitimate
channels. Therefore the Finnish - Russian and the
Russian - Estonian border will be targeted by organised
crime to secure the movement of people illegally due,
in part, to the accession of Estonia to the EU. The
project investigates the flow of people illegally from
Russia (3rd Country) into Finland (destination and transit
country) and Estonia (transit country) and how
facilitated people are moved onward. Particular
attention is focused on the possible processes of
corruption in relation to existing structures. Once a
person has reached a transit country the research is
structured to investigate the progress to a destination
country1. A further area of the research project is how
illegal immigration results in new forms of organised
crime, by those who have entered illegally, in a
destination country (see for example Richards 2004).
There are four key research questions:
1. How is corruption used to secure the
passage of people across borders?
2. Is there evidence that border controls are
weak?
3. How are people moved from one EU
member state to another?
4. What is the impact of illegal forms
immigration on crime rates and organised
crime and criminal groups/networks in
destination countries?
The research project is structured to allow for the
exchange of knowledge between key law enforcement
personnel in each of the participating countries. In each
country there is a Local Network Group comprising
of law enforcement professionals with responsibility
for immigration, border control, ‘organised’ crime and
prosecutions. At two critical points in the research
process, the interim and final report stage, the Local
Network Groups are brought together to form a
Project Network Group. The Project Network
Group is involved in the review of the research data
and contribute to the analysis of the data. This Interim
Project Report is in part the product of the Project
Network Group that met in Tallinn in January 20062.
There are five areas which have emerged from
the research data in the first phase; first, corruption
and document fraud, second, the illegal crossing of
borders, third, the identification of key policy issues,
fourth, the exploitation of people entering the EU
illegally and finally the role of organised crime and
criminal networks. Each of these areas will be discussed
in detail in this report.
The illegal movement of people across borders is
not a new phenomenon, there has always been a
movement of people for a number of reasons. However,
as the disparities between the developed and developing
worlds widen so one impetus for migration is that of
1 A source country is the country of origin of people migrating, a transit country is one that a facilitated person moves through, and a
destination country is that country to which they wish to enter as their final destination.
2 The project was launched in 2005 and is to close by the end of 2006. The main data are collected by interviewing some 30 relevant
authority representatives in each country. Interim and final findings are presented for discussion and commentary to meetings of the
Project Network Groups and the Local Network Groups at different stages of the project.
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economics. However, for many the decision to migrate
without the necessary entry requirements of the
country of choice can be a hazardous and dangerous
decision as the means of entry will by necessity be
illegal. Within the European Union (EU) there is an
expectation that there should be a free movement of
people between member states. This is to assist in the
economic development, free movement of labour and
to ensure responsive markets are responsive. However,
as recent research has indicated the development of
markets and of responsive labour markets is not an
even process and labour markets develop in relation to
profitability and the regulation of wages (Peck et al.
2005). The principle of free movement creates a
number of anxieties, and for some states such a principle
has political implications, for member states. The
concern is that once a person has managed to obtain
entry to the EU they have freedom of movement across
all EU member states virtually unhindered.
It was such an anxiety caused by this free
movement of people that resulted in the UK and Ireland
not signing the Schengen Agreement in 1994. For
member states illegal immigration is a political issue
and creates a number of political difficulties and a
consequence in some EU member states is the impetus
the issue provides for far right politics. One response
to illegal immigration by the EU has been to strengthen
border security through forms of co-operation and the
introduction of FRONTEX3 is evidence of such a
response. At the same time individual countries have
introduced more restrictive policies in relation to
immigration (Anti-Slavery International 2002).
The number of people being moved is difficult to
calculate, however, the numbers are thought to be
considerable (Woodbridge 2005). The opportunities that
this presents to criminal networks, crime groups and
organised crime is obvious. Individuals will pay to be
moved from a source country to a destination country,
or for component parts of each journey. The numbers
of people, the practical difficulty in securing borders
and the potential opportunities for exploitation of those
who are illegally moved are considerable. The potential
gains from facilitation and trafficking are ones that
attract all types of criminal enterprise. As Koser (2001)
has argued there are three key debates, “….the efficacy
of asylum policies, the trafficking of asylum seekers
and their increasing vulnerability” and each of these
debates is effected by criminal activity and criminal
justice policy responses.
Defining the Problem and Securing
Borders
The number of illegal immigrants in any of the
participating countries is difficult to quantify. In Finland
and Estonia there are some obvious measures, for
example any black or minority ethnic populations would
be highly visible in Finnish and Estonian society as these
are not strongly multi-cultural societies. However, this
did not rule out that there could be a number of people
illegally in the country, for example Russians who have
entered legally and over stayed would not be visible
either physically or through language in Estonia; (in
Finland, however, the Russian language would be a
possible clue). In the UK with a culturally diverse
society it is difficult to identify people in the country
illegally by physical characteristics and lack of English
as a language is also not an identifying factor.
Consequently people who enter the UK illegally are
able to conceal themselves in a range of communities
that are established and living in the country legally.
The lack of any reliable means of estimating the
number of people in a country illegally (Woodbridge
2005) means that other ways of measuring the impact
of illegal immigration are used. Crime figures may be
one useful indicator of the provisional size of a country’s
illegal immigrant population; for instance how many
people are arrested for offences who are not in the
country legally? Victimisation statistics would also be
a useful measure, although people in a country illegally
are not likely to report crimes due to their illegal status.
Social indicators may also be useful in determining if
there is a problem, for example the number of women
who are not a national of the country employed in the
sex industry, or persons employed in construction work
and other sectors employing casualised labour.
3 FRONTEX is a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union and was established to improve integrated management at the EU’s external borders.
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It is apparent that the issue of secure borders is one of
definition and perception. For example, it can be defined
as ‘destination’ country problem as it is there that
people entering the EU illegally are intending to go to
and therefore not the problem of the transit country. It
might be that destination countries have a range of
factors that make them ‘more desirable’ destinations
than other countries; the presence of  established
expatriate communities could be considered a ‘pull’
factor (Aromaa 1995.)
Actually defining who is an illegal immigrant is
also problematic. A number of problems can be
identified in relation to the definition of ‘illegal
immigrant’. First, the status of the immigrant may
change over time, so a person may enter a country
legally but over stay and therefore become illegal. The
legal status also creates confusion in relation to those
people who are trafficked. Many trafficked people have
crossed a border legitimately. It is their exploitation
which is illegal rather than their residence status.
The introduction of the Schengen Agreement did
not exacerbate the problem of illegal immigration.
Finland experienced an increase in the number of illegal
immigrants shortly after joining Schengen; however,
this was shortlived and  thought to have been the result
of those facilitating the movement of people across
borders testing ‘new’ Schengen border arrangements.
For many member states Schengen was viewed
positively as it provided a unified and common system
of monitoring border movements that relied on the
sharing of information and the use of agreed
procedures and protocols. This can be seen to provide
a much greater ability to control border crossing points
across the EU as it takes place within an agreed and
unified structure.
Whilst the above were viewed as positives there
was also recognition that there were some negative
aspects. Schengen allows for the free movement of
people, it also allows for the free movement of criminal
networks and allows crime groups the opportunity to
exploit the ability to move freely and establish links to
extend and broaden their networks.
Borders are difficult to secure, there are many points
of vulnerability and it is clear that in many respects
border controls are reactive to the new forms of
strategies used by those wishing to circumvent them.
An example of this is the establishment of ‘Juxtaposed
Controls4’ between the UK and France and the UK
and Belgium in an attempt to prevent the illegal crossing
of the borders prior to the border being crossed. The
Finnish-Russian border represents a different approach.
In Finland, a model referred to as Police-Customs-
Border Guard-Cooperation (PCB-coop) was developed
to meet the needs of improved authority cooperation
within the country. This model was then extended to
incorporate also the Russian counterparts who
participate in regular cross-border meetings which
amount annually to hundreds at local level, about 100
at regional level, and 2-4 at executive level.
There are three key issues in assessing border
security; first the level of systematic corruption of border
guards at the border crossing point. It was recognised
by all respondents that there were occasions when a
border guard may well be corrupt or susceptible to
bribes but that the real test was whether there is any
evidence of systematic corruption of border guard
personnel where the corruption flows from the top of
the organisation to the bottom. It is also recognised
that some borders have particular points of vulnerability.
These vulnerable points may be at particular times of
the day, or particular times on particular days, or at the
point of shift change. These points are not indicators
of corruption but are pointers towards vulnerability of
borders to exploitation of weaknesses by those wishing
to facilitate the movement of people.In attempting to
assess how secure a border is there are a number of
potential measures; the number of refusals at a border
crossing point, as the level of refusals is one indicator
that border guards are engaged in their work and
actively attempting to prevent illegal entry. There are
also a number of potential ways of strengthening borders
and one is the employment of extra border guards.
However, such a strategy does not always result in a
reduction of the number of people entering a country
illegally. Another strategy is to increase the use of
technological devices to prevent illegal entry, such as
4 Juxtaposed Controls is where UK immigration is located at the French and Belgian Channel ports, likewise the French Gendarme have border
crossing controls at the major UK channel ports.
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the heat seeking devices and detectors of movements
in freight traffic, that are used at a number of ports.
However all of this, additional personnel and
technological devices require a financial commitment
from states and has policy implications  on how border
agencies are structured, for example are certain
activities contracted out to the private sector5?
There are other ways to protect and secure
borders. Whilst increasing staff and technological
know-how may lead to a reduction in the number of
people entering a country illegally it does not address
the roots of the problem. A more far reaching means
of dealing with the problem of illegal immigration is to
attempt to control the flow and direction of people
moving illegally. This is probably easier said than done
as the movement and migration of people is an issue
that is linked to the movement of global capital, the
restructuring of production and the needs of the wider
European economy and the economic wellbeing of some
member states.
It is not possible to quantify the size of illegal
immigration with any degree of reliability as the nature
of the problem is such that it is hidden and so the
number of people illegally in any country is a matter of
an informed guess. It may not be necessary to quantify
the problem with exact numbers but other indicators
such as levels of criminal involvement, activity in
relation to prostitution may prove to be ‘good indicators’
of the extent of the problem in any one country. It is
also acknowledged that not all cases of illegal
immigration are the result of a person entering a country
illegally. Many people enter a state legally but remain
without permission after their right to residence has
expired. This is a complicating factor in trying to assess
the ‘size of the problem’.
In order to understand the attraction of some
states as destination countries it is important to analyse
the historical traditions and the social composition of
the destination country. So, a country with a long colonial
history may well experience illegal immigration from
former colonies. Other countries may have a record
of receiving certain groups and communities and there
that country becomes a focal point because of the size
of its ‘expatriate’ communities. Such communities
provide places of shelter and also provide a common
language and a basis of knowing how the new society
actually functions. (Aromaa 1995.) Such expatriate
communities also usually have links with communities
in the country of origin and so it makes the arrangement
of travel and entry easier. It also adds another dimension
to the process of facilitation where the motivation may
not be money alone but also a sense of loyalty to an
area, region or town. For many states the issue of illegal
immigration is a politically charged one and this has an
influence on how policy in this area is structured and
delivered.
Illegal immigration is a problematic for many
states. For some, such as the UK, the problem is that
the UK is a destination state and with that comes a
range of subsidiary problems which include possible
effects on crime and the structure of the sex industry.
For other states, such as Finland, it was clear that the
problem was not one of being a destination country but
a series of issues in relation to people entering illegally
and thus rendering some of the border areas vulnerable
to corruption and other illegal practices. The global
issues were also recognised by respondents where the
links between economic performance, availability of
labour and the costs, both human and economic, of
illegal immigration, were understood.
The Role and Extent of Corruption
Corruption is of particular interest because the use of
corrupt practices to secure the compliance of officials
allows criminals an easy passage across borders and
at the same time legitimates their illegal practices. For
example, the corruption of a border guard could result
in official residence stamps being placed in a passport,
ignoring false documents or impostors. For those
attempting to facilitate people illegally across borders
corruption is one of the key methods used to achieve
such ends as it lowers the risk at one of the most
vulnerable parts of the journey.
5 In the case of Finland, the same result has been traditionally achieved by the strong Russian border controls on which the Finnish authorities
have been able to rely. Whether this will be so also in the future remains to be seen.
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The definition of corruption used in the research is:
“…many kinds of “irregular” influence, the
objective of which is to allow the participants
to make profits they are not entitled to, the
method being the breaking of internal or
external rules.”
For some of the respondents this definition would
have been more accurate if profit was replaced by
‘gain’. The idea that the profit or gain was solely
individual was also questioned by some respondents
who argued that a person may make a gain for others
through loyalty or family affiliation. The important point
to note is that many respondents considered that the
process of corruption might take place at a distance
from the port of entry and that it was not a simple
matter of the offer of a monetary reward, other forms
of favourable treatment may also act as an inducement
to behave in a corrupt fashion.
There is a need to identify the risk factors in
relation to corruption. The level of remuneration of
border guards is one such indicator, low salaries of
border guards is a potential weakness and likely to be
exploited by criminal groups. One strategic means of
eliminating the potential risks and weaknesses is by
identifying the weaknesses and taking action to remedy
them where at all possible. It is apparent that there are
social structural reasons that also contribute to
corruption being more difficult; for example in Finland
there are very low levels of corruption among public
officials. The reason for such low levels of corruption
might be that there is a tradition of high moral standards
amongst Finnish civil servants and a high level of
transparency of state institutions and the actions of
public officials. In Finland there is a very high degree
of loyalty to state institutions that requires
commensurate levels of behaviour. So, it is important
to analyse the social context within which corruption
occurs if an accurate threat assessment can be
undertaken.
This need to understand the social context and
how it changes over time is evident in relation to Estonia.
The movement of people across the Estonian border
does not appear to be a significant issue in relation to
corruption; however, goods and money appear to be
the weak points in relation to corruption. So, it is
commodities that are more profitable than people
currently within the Estonian context. However, it is
also apparent that in certain situations people are
commodities and therefore this may result in future
vulnerability for Estonia. The strategy in relation to
corruption for all states should be the elimination of
risk; this requires the identification of weaknesses and
vulnerable points, an understanding of the social and
economic context and the need to define potential future
threats.
The research undertaken by all three countries
indicates that corruption is not systemic or endemic in
any of the three countries. There were isolated cases
and what was described as low level bribery. There
are also no indications that the findings of this research
are inaccurate as a number of officials from different
agencies confirmed that corruption was not regularised
or tolerated. The low levels of corruption may also
indicate that there are other criminal strategies that
are used to facilitate entry.
Moving People Across Borders
The movement of people across borders is not a new
phenomenon. However the socio-political and economic
context has changed greatly over the past two decades.
The globalisation of markets, production and
consumption has resulted in the movement of people
to meet the new demands for labour in developed
areas. Consequently there are numerous ways in which
people are moved across borders. The desire for
individual people to move from their country of
residence where they have legal status to a country
where they will be considered an illegal immigrant is
one that is motivated by a number of factors; the desire
to improve their economic position, to avoid torture and
interrogation at the hands of political dictators, to join
family in the destination country and to access what is
seen to be a better and more stable life are just a few
of the reasons. The journey from the country of origin
to the destination country can be a dangerous and
12HEUNI Paper No. 24
arduous one and provides many opportunities for
criminal groups, organised crime and criminal networks
to exploit through a variety of entrepreneurial activities.
In order to understand the process of facilitation
it is important to recognise that there are very many
different ways in which a person can be moved across
a border but we would define three models of
facilitation. First is the Organised Facilitation model.
A person can purchase in the country of origin a total
package that they buy from the facilitator [s] a travel
package with the necessary documentation that will
move them from the point of origin to the destination
country using false document to allow the individual to
travel in relative comfort. The journey may be staged
and during the waiting periods the person being moved
will be put up in ‘safe houses’ and moved into the
destination country on forged documents. This ‘tailor-
made’ package is expensive and can also take a
considerable amount of time, for example the journey
from China to the UK could take anywhere up to nine
or twelve months and such journeys rely on a good
organisation in order to make the journey a successful
one and is usually the domain of organised crime
groups. Second is the Component Facilitation model.
A person buys the journey in individual pieces; so the
crossing of the border is purchased from a facilitator
and once over the border it is then up to them to make
the necessary contacts in order to continue their journey.
This again relies on criminal networks rather than
organised crime and the facilitation usually is in the
form of concealment in a truck, van or car. The
facilitated person arranges and buys each component
part of the journey, usually completing one part of the
journey before negotiating and paying for the next
component part. This may involve them in contact with
a number of criminal groups and networks as they make
their journey. The type of journey that they make can
vary from being facilitated in the back of a lorry or by
a courier taking them across the border. The difference
is that the facilitation is not organised from the point of
departure to the point of arrival and is not undertaken
by the same organisation. The final model of facilitation
is what can be termed Opportunistic Facilitation, this
relies on the individual attempting to make their own
way in many circumstances either because their
resources will not cover the final part of the journey or
they have not established the contacts to enable them
to have an organised facilitation. It is this group of
people who attempt to gain entry by jumping trucks at
the ports or by concealing themselves on trains. For
many this is a hazardous means of gaining entry. So,
each of these facilitation models requires different types
of organisation, from the highly organised to the
disorganized, relying on criminal groups or networks
and in some cases organised crime. The model by
Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) provides a definition
of the different types of crime groupings:
Fig 1.
 
(Taken from Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004)
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The first diagrammatic representation suggests a very
closed network, in the typology used by Bruinsma
and Bernasco (2004) this is most common in relation
to the movement of drugs, a tight network protecting
the commodity as it makes its journey from origin to
destination. The second diagram suggests gaps
between contact with the crime networks or groups
and this is similar to our model of Component
Facilitation. The third diagram shows very little
contact with crime groups other than at the beginning
and the end of the journey. This in our view
corresponds to our Opportunistic Facilitation model
where there has to be some initial contact to make
the first part of the journey and there may be a
connection to a crime group or network in the
destination country.
In relation to each of the models certain types
of criminal activity make the process of facilitation
easier and less risky. Fraudulent documentation is
one such criminal activity. Document fraud and
forgers up until the expansion of the internet were
usually group and area-specific.  So, an illegal
immigrant would obtain their fraudulent documents
from a forger working in their country of origin.
However, organised crime by exploiting the internet,
has led to forgery and fraudulent documents
becoming more widespread as they are able to exploit
the market and business opportunity by supplying
documents globally. Criminal groups have taken
advantage of the global market place and are able to
provide a service to anyone who is willing to pay.
The internet has resulted in the purchasing of
fraudulent documents to facilitate illegal immigration
more accessible, more sophisticated, and more
widespread.
Fraudulent documents are also used in relation
to the accession states in the Baltic region. A person
from Ukraine, for example, can enter Lithuania
relatively easily due to pre-EU border crossing
relationships. Once a person has crossed into
Lithuania they can acquire a forged Lithuanian
passport or they can act as an impostor on real
documents and move freely across the EU.
Therefore, there is a considerable market in forged
and fraudulent documents. So, the UK witnesses a
significant increase in the number people attempting to
enter the UK on forged documents, for example there
has been a dramatic rise in the number of Ukrainian people
entering the UK on false documents.
In relation to Finland there had been an increase in
the use of false documents and the methods by which
different countries issue identification documentation can
also result in opportunities for forgery. For example in
Russia both the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs
issue identity documents used for travel and so these
documents can be easily counterfeited. There was some
evidence within Estonia that forgery was taking place,
however, identity theft was the main issue. Another noted
feature of the Estonian situation was that some people
had made false claims for citizenship and then obtained a
passport once citizenship was granted. The citizenship
was illegal and yet the passport was a legal document. In
the UK there was evidence of high quality forgeries of
varying nationalities produced using advanced
technologies and linked to organised crime groups; such
documents are difficult to detect, requiring highly skilled
intelligence officers. The organisation of forgery appears
to be highly sophisticated with large scale forgery
factories and highly sophisticated distribution networks.
For example in Lithuania there was the small-scale
independent production of forged Euros. A law
enforcement operation was conducted against the crime
group and the operation dismantled, however, knowledge
of how to counterfeit documents remained and production
shifted towards a new market, the counterfeiting of
passports.
There is evidence of sophisticated production and
distribution networks with organised crime groups acting
as the main entrepreneurs. However, the internet has
allowed for the production of forged documents outside
of the country of origin, so UK passports can be forged
in Lithuania for example. However, whilst there have
been successes by law enforcement agencies in detecting
the production sites of false documents it is also apparent
that forgeries are difficult to detect making the job of the
border guards more difficult. There is also some evidence
that documents are re-used and this indicates the
organisation of facilitation by criminal groups or individuals
in cases where the documentation is re-used.
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Exploitation & Labour
The research project is also designed to explore the
nature of exploitation, especially if there is involvement
in criminal activities by those who have been facilitated,
and what is the nature of this criminal activity. However,
it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between
those who are in a country legally and yet are exploited
and those who are facilitated or trafficked. The problem
with a policy that simply focuses on illegal migration is
that it does not cover the proportion of exploited
migrants who arrived legally and yet find themselves
in highly exploitative work situations. So many people
working in exploited forms of labour may not be in the
country illegally, therefore they have rights which are
legally protected, and however, such rights can be
overlooked when the policy focus is simply one that is
centred on immigration. The need to protect the
integrity of state’s immigration systems is an important
and legitimate interest. However, much policy tends to
prioritise combating illegal migration over protecting
human rights of exploited workers and guaranteeing
fundamental labour rights to all workers.
There is also a focus on coercion in relation to
the exploitation of immigrant workers. The UN
Trafficking protocol includes elements of coercion into
the definition of trafficking, the use of coercion as a
distinguishing element is problematic on several levels.
First it creates a dichotomy between the ‘genuine and
non-genuine’ victim of trafficking and/or exploitation.
‘Genuine’ victims are seen as deserving of assistance
and those defined as ‘non-genuine’ do not receive
assistance. There is an important question concerning
how the genuine victim is defined. It appears in the
UK that the deserving victim is young, female, over
18, subjected to forced sexual services, and willing to
collaborate with the authorities (see for example Kelly
2004). But even within that group, the number of the
‘deserving’ victims can be seen as being limited, for
example in the UK the Poppy Project, for victims of
trafficking, has only been able to assist 25 women at
any given time (see http://www.womeninlondon.org.uk/
notices/eaves0409.htm). However, not all trafficked
women are forced to work in the sex industry and some
are in domestic servitude as well as other forms of
highly casualised and poorly remunerated labour,
however, there is also a policy tension where one type
of forced labour is seen to be more deserving than
another.
Some Interim Conclusions
The first conclusion is that the overall response to illegal
immigration is, in the member states studied, a law
enforcement one, or one that relies on criminal justice
strategies to prevent illegal immigration. Every state
has strategies to combat illegal immigration; for some
countries this is a greater problem than for others. The
UK is a destination country and so it finds itself the
subject of many attempts by people to enter illegally. It
is also an issue of considerable political complexity and
so there are a number of co-ordinated strategic
interventions, for example a dedicated office within the
Crown Prosecution Service to focus on immigration
crime and the setting up by the Home Office of
REFLEX. These are dedicated teams under the
operational direction of Chief Constables within police
areas. REFLEX teams may be partnership based
bringing together criminal justice professionals from
across different criminal justice areas, for example
immigration and police. The teams may have an
operational function or they may be a means of co-
ordinating intelligence to inform joint Police and
Immigration Service operations in that area.
The REFLEX approach in the UK has been
thought to be relatively successful as it has made the
terrain on which organised crime operates more hostile.
REFLEX can also exploit the network of overseas
liaison officers to share intelligence and co-ordinate
operations. The establishment of EUROPOL is one of
the ways in which countries share intelligence and
undertake joint operations. There is some evidence that
EUROPOL has been a successful agency in the
countering of illegal immigration with shared operations
and the apprehension of organised crime members
involved in facilitation. The setting up of FRONTEX,
similar to the Finnish model of “PCB-coop” indicates
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a development in the EU strategy to protect borders
by collaboration with external countries. However, the
Finnish model, REFLEX, EUROPOL and FRONTEX
are all criminal based strategies using law enforcement
and criminal sanction as a means to combat illegal
immigration.
The second conclusion is that there are many
different forms of crime groups operating in the illegal
immigration market. These can be characterised as
Organised Facilitation, Component Facilitation and
Opportunistic Facilitation and they conform broadly
to the organisational structure as defined by Bruinsma
and Bernasco (2004). It is important in addressing issues
of illegal immigration to understand the arenas in which
these different crime groups operate, as they do not
appear to operate across all types of illegal immigration
activity. Thirdly, there does not appear to be any form
of systemic corruption in the states that form the basis
of our research. There were examples of individual
cases but none of systematic and organised corruption
of public officials that would fall within our definition,
that is corruption within the three countries. Possible
corruption in Russia became indirectly visible at least
in the Finnish data. Fourthly, there is a large and active
market in the supply of forged documents. It is here
that the organisational requirements of organised crime
groups are evident. Fifthly, there is a need to understand
the social, economic and political context of each
country. For example, there has been a long tradition
of immigration to the UK and so there are many
expatriate communities. The UK has a long colonial
history and this contributes to the focus of the UK as a
destination country. Consequently, it is apparent that
the movement of people is not random and that the
choice of destination country is based on historical
associations and connections made with family and
friends6.
The world of illegal immigration is obscured by
the clandestine nature of the activity. This makes
undertaking research difficult as there is plenty of law
enforcement personnel to interview but those involved
in illegal immigration in relation to either the facilitator
or the facilitated are difficult to find. In relation to the
person who crosses a border illegally they are a
conundrum for many criminal justice agencies as they
are both the offender and the victim at the same time.
There is no clear demarcation between the offender
and the victim and this makes for uneasy policy making
and implementation and partly explains the official
criminal justice responses to those who are moved
illegally. It is hoped that the next phase of this research
will shed some light on this murkier world.
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